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ABSTRACT
How do authoritarian rulers legitimate repressive actions against their own citizens?
Although most research depicts repression and legitimation as opposed strategies
of political rule, justified coercion against some groups may generate legitimacy in
the eyes of other parts of the population. Building upon this suggested link
between legitimation and repression, this article studies the justifications of mass
killings. To this end, framing theory is combined with recent research on the
domestic and international dimensions of authoritarian rule. We contend that
frames are directed towards specific audiences at home and abroad. Moreover,
given the common threats at the global level and the diffusion of repressive tactics,
we assume that learning processes influence discursive justifications of repression in
authoritarian regimes. We provide an analysis of government rhetoric by comparing
the protest crackdowns of Rabi’a ‘Adawiya Square in Egypt and Fergana Valley in
Uzbekistan, taking into account the audiences and the sources of the frames that
justify repression. In both cases, we find the terrorism frame to emerge as dominant.
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1. Introduction
How do authoritarian rulers legitimate repressive actions against their own citizens? Most
of the literature views legitimation and repression as diametrically opposed strategies of
political rule, claiming that an increase in legitimation reduces the need for repression,
while an increase in repression automatically decreases legitimacy.1 We contend that to
reduce the danger of delegitimizing political rule and thus to decrease the costs of repres-
sion,2 authoritarian elites often put forward discursive justifications for the use of repres-
sion. Going further, besides lowering the cost of repression, successfully justified
repression may, in some instances, even serve the purpose of creating legitimacy.
From an empirical perspective, legitimacy is an observable relation between the ruler
and the ruled. Therefore, different societal groups may assess regime legitimacy in
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different ways. State repression in itself may generate support from certain segments of
the population and/or from international actors. Thus, legitimation and repression can
be perceived as two sides of the same coin. This article focuses on how repression is jus-
tified, with justification defined as the official explanation or defence of state action, as
one part of the latter’s discursive legitimation. We assume that the addressees of legit-
imation discourses extend beyond domestic audiences to the international sphere. We
also take into account the sources of justifications, which may be historical experiences
or international learning from global discourses. Recent studies on the international
dimensions of authoritarian rule have highlighted patterns of diffusion and learning
between autocracies.
Our theoretical approach integrates recent research on the domestic and inter-
national dimensions of authoritarian rule with insights from framing theory. To
examine how repressive policies are justified, and to whom, we analyse the Uzbek
and Egyptian governments’ rhetoric during and after the repressive crackdowns of
Andijon in 2005 and Rabi’a ‘Adawiya Square in 2013. These extreme instances of
high-intensity coercion, often described as domestic massacres, were highly visible
and thus necessitated public justification.3 We present a conceptual framework for
studying the justification of repression, tracing how domestic and international
sources of learning influenced the choice of frames. Moreover, we look at both domestic
and international addressees to account for differences between frames. In the explora-
tive empirical analysis, we analyse similarities and differences in the frames that Uzbek
and Egyptian regime elites used to legitimize the repression of domestic protest move-
ments. In the final sections, we formulate hypotheses based on our findings and outline
agendas for future research.
2. Conceptualizing justifications of repression
2.1. How does justification work? Combining framing theory and autocracy
research
When the security apparatus acts forcefully against certain groups, state representatives
often present the target as a threat to the public. This mechanism can be analysed by
using framing theory. Framing denotes the way in which issues are presented, what
underlying narratives and what solutions are offered.4 While framing analyses in pol-
itical science often focus on social movements, we contribute to the literature centred
on governmental frames. For authoritarian regimes, the literature often focuses on legit-
imation as the intended result of official framing.5 Despite some insightful contri-
butions,6 governmental framing in authoritarian contexts is still undertheorized.
Borrowing from research on the related concept of securitization and on authoritarian-
ism, we introduce two specifications:
First, in democratic contexts framing research often studies how governmental frames
are adapted and transformed by journalists.7 In autocracies with censorship and con-
trolled media governments convey certain messages more directly to the public. Thus,
we study the nature and origins of justification frames rather than their transmission.
Second, despite governmental control over the public sphere, the results of framing
processes are not predetermined, as “frames do not have a single, universal effect” on
the recipients.8 Depending on who the target audience is, the framing of repression
can have legitimizing or delegitimizing effects. Moreover, securitization literature
DEMOCRATIZATION 883
suggests that audiences in autocracies do not necessarily comprise all citizens of a state.
Instead, a security issue may be communicated to the elite or strategically important
groups.9 This is in line with more general research on authoritarian regimes’ strategies.
Legitimation as a relational category means that legitimacy claims are directed towards
target groups, such as elites, the broader population, or different societal groups.10 In
this article, we focus on framing and its sources rather than on the success of
framing endeavours.
2.2. What frames are used for justifying repression?
Few political scientists have studied the discursive justification of repression.11 Dukals-
kis investigates popular protests in China in 1989, Myanmar in 2007, and Iran in 2009–
2010, and finds that protesters were blamed as criminals for inciting disorder and for
being manipulated by foreigners and “not committed to the regime’s vision of legiti-
macy”. We agree with his conclusion that authoritarian incumbents “attempt to
endorse that repression in ways consistent with their legitimating messages”.12 To
describe how legitimating messages in authoritarian regimes work more generally,
March posits that
[t]he main strategy is to define the entire state in relation to common goals, to define the goals
and aspirations as virtually constitutive of the nation as such, and to equate the regime with the
proper articulation and realization of those goals through the state apparatus.13
A variety of goals or values in line with more general patterns of legitimation can be
invoked to justify repression. Since personalist rule with demobilizing strategies has
existed for a while in many authoritarian regimes, we expect justifications to revolve
around stability.14 Other justifications range from state-related arguments such as
national unity, legality, security,15 and public order to sociocultural aspects of tradition.
Governments often label their opponents’ activities as “harmful behaviour” threatening
these values, which in Snow and Benford’s terminology can be considered a diagnostic
master frame.16 Table 1 lists different underlying values that regime discourse claims to
be endangered by corresponding, alleged oppositional behaviour.
2.3. Bridging the domestic and international levels: target audiences of
justification and sources of learning
So far, the discussion has pointed to one factor that shapes justifications of repression,
the target audiences of frames, as legitimation and framing are relational processes.
There is another important factor determining which frames are used. Elites usually
Table 1. Harmful behaviour and endangered values.
Endangered value Frame: harmful behaviour (by target of repression)
National unity Division of society
History, tradition; sovereignty Foreign influence
Legality Criminal behaviour
Security of state and society Terrorism; violence; attacking, intimidating state
(representatives & institutions), persons & property
Public order, everyday life Disruption of traffic, activities, production
Stability Unrest
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do not invent their strategies from scratch, but draw on sources of inspiration and
examples. Both factors are relevant on the domestic and international levels.
Regarding target audiences or addressees of justification frames, the domestic audi-
ence can consist of particular groups, such as the regime base, that are subject to selec-
tive legitimation attempts. However, frames can also target the broader population.
Beyond these audiences, framing might address actors on the international level –
for example, neighbouring states, the international community, regional and inter-
national organizations, or diaspora populations.
The audiences need to accept governmental frames, so it can be assumed that elites
choose their rhetoric strategically. However, one must avoid the tautological trap of pre-
supposing that elites always use the frames that are likely to resonate, as framing litera-
ture shows that extreme or otherwise unsuitable frames are often used. In the
exceptional context of public extra-judicial killings, credible justification is necessary.
In line with Dukalskis’17 argument, we expect justifications of repression to fit with
broader legitimating strategies. For example, if a Western audience is a key addressee
of legitimation, issues of importance to this addressee – human rights, rule of law,
and so on – are likely to be broached.
Both the international and the domestic context are not only home to (potential)
addressees of justification but often also inspire elites. Authoritarian elites learn from
their past experiences.18 On the global level, discourses on human rights and democracy
became salient in the 1990s. A contrasting narrative of terrorism has been added to
these narratives since 2001, and repressive tactics and their discursive justifications at
both the regional and the international levels have diffused. These developments
have shifted the repertoires of authoritarian leaders away from democratic window-
dressing and towards more self-confident assertions of their power. We argue that
traces of learning can be observed in authoritarian regimes’ discourses.
The recent literature on authoritarian learning suggests that international linkages
facilitate learning processes to optimize repression.19 Linkages are especially strong
between countries that are geographically proximate or similar in regime type. Yet,
in security-related issues, robust linkages also exist between the West and the Arab
world regarding the exchange of surveillance technology and military hardware.20
Thus, sources of learning include neighbouring countries or other regional states,
similar states elsewhere, and remote hegemonic players. The country’s own past also
offers important lessons. Finally, learning may relate to positive or negative examples;
that is, learning from success or failure. In sum, we assume that frames are influenced by
who the domestic and international addressees are as well as by the learning sources of
authoritarian elites (see Table 2).
2.4. Research design and case selection
To generate insights on how repression is justified and derive hypotheses on causal
factors, we conduct a paired comparison of two explorative case studies: Egypt and
Table 2. Factors shaping justification patterns.
Domestic International
Addressees Targeting discourse towards regime base or all citizens Targeting discourse towards allies
Sources Learning from history Learning from abroad
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Uzbekistan. In many ways, these authoritarian states are trendsetters and central to
their regions, with the largest number of citizens in the Arab world and Central Asia,
respectively. The countries are predominantly Muslim and have a poor record in
regard to civil and political liberties. Both Egypt and Uzbekistan are key allies of
Western powers in the global war on terror and have had phases of intense confronta-
tion with oppositional Islamic movements, militant and peaceful.
As different types of repression would require different narratives, we hold an
important factor constant by comparing similar instances of repression. We choose
highly visible, lethal, and extra-judicial repression, which necessitates great justification
efforts, assuming that Egypt and Uzbekistan represent typical cases of justifications for
repression that enable us to further investigate causal mechanisms.21 We investigate
each state’s justification of its most brutal repressive incident in recent decades, both
of which have been referred to as the respective country’s “Tiananmen Square”.22
Despite the generally high level of repression that these countries have in common,
the crackdowns in the Fergana Valley in Uzbekistan in 2005 and in Rabi’a ‘Adawiya
Square in Egypt in 2013, resulting in hundreds of deaths, were extraordinary and led
to a ranking of 4/4 on the Political Terror Scale for the year of the mass repression.23
The cases displaymany similarities, but also some differences in factors that we assume
to impact on justification frames. Concerning international aspects, in the years preceding
the respective crackdowns, relations to Western democracies were important to both
countries, yet Uzbekistan also had close contacts with Russia and China. On the domestic
level, the regimephase duringwhich the repression incidents occurreddiffered. InEgypt, a
new post-coupmilitary regime tried to get rid of the former incumbents, whilst inUzbeki-
stan, Karimov had ruled for 16 years. These conditions offered differing possibilities for
legitimation and thus necessities for justification. The empirical analysis explores how
these similarities and differences influence justifications for repression.
In our qualitative frame analysis, the first taskwas to detect the frames employed. After
having categorized the frames, we also investigated changes over time, such as shifts in
“strategic narratives”.24 Our analysis drew on publicly available sources such as scholarly
works, newspaper articles, blogs, and reports. Most importantly, we examined public
statements made by officials before and in the aftermath of violent protests to extract
the justifications presented to the public. In particular, we conducted a qualitative
content analysis of a corpus of 15 speeches and press statements by the Uzbek President
Karimov and Egypt’s military chief al-Sisi complemented by officials’ statements in
media reports. They address various audiences in the period two months before and
until two years after the respective repressive crackdown. The frames derived from our
theoretical approach in Table 1 were treated as the initial codes. We then analysed the
primary sources with regard to the occurrence and context of these frames and comple-
mented them with inductively derived codes. Furthermore, the laws according to which
protesters were prosecuted and the accusations made in court offer insights as to how
repression was justified, and were complemented by information on legal proceedings
in the case of arrest and subsequent trial. This allowed us to capture both the justification
of concrete repressive actions and the broader engineered narratives of these events.
3. Empirical analysis
In the following section, we first describe the repression in the most relevant episodes of
high-intensity coercion in Egypt in 2013 and in Uzbekistan in 2005. We then outline the
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frames that regime elites used to legitimize repression. We trace back the justifications
to specific sources of learning and the respective target audiences.
3.1. Repressive behaviour
3.1.1. Repression of the Muslim Brotherhood
The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) has a historically ambivalent relationship with the
Egyptian state. Since 1952, state repression has alternated with periods of tolerance.
Also, militant jihadism has challenged the state at various times, peaking in 1981
with the assassination of President Sadat and again during the 1990s. During times
of greater toleration, the MB has played a role in formal politics through participation
in parliamentary elections, while at other times its members have faced arrest. The 2011
uprising and Mubarak’s ouster were a game changer. The MB was the best organized
group and won the subsequent parliamentary elections with over 40% of the seats. It
also won the presidential elections, and Muhammad Mursi took office in June 2012.
However, the group’s attempt to monopolize power and rule in an exclusive manner
led to mass mobilization, which was fuelled by the army and resulted in a military
coup on 30 June 2013 that was broadly supported by societal groups. The MB did
not want to give up on its elected offices, and many of its supporters staged sit-ins;
some also attacked security forces. The coup brought about a drastic reversal of the
MB’s status and MB politicians were arrested on a large scale. The most brutal instances
of repression took place on 14 August 2013 with the forceful clearance of the Rabi’a
‘Adawiya and Nahda Square protest sites in Cairo. Armoured vehicles, special forces
from the Interior Ministry, and snipers on the roofs of military buildings fired at peace-
ful civilians, shooting and in part even burning an estimated 1,000 people to death.25
Many protesters were arrested. In return, the US government immediately cancelled
a joint military exercise and in October decided to withhold the delivery of some
large-scale military systems.26 Ironically, assistance for counterterrorism was not
frozen, nor was the bulk of one billion in annual military aid.27 The MB was outlawed
in September 2013 and declared a terrorist organization in December. The repression
ever since has drastically narrowed the public sphere and heavily affected the media,
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and universities. Army Commander-in-
Chief and coup leader al-Sisi tightened his grip on power and was elected president
in May 2014.
3.1.2. Repression under Karimov
Ever since independence in 1991, Uzbekistan’s government has adopted a sceptical
stance towards religion, in particular Islam. Then-President Karimov feared that
pan-Islamic tendencies would threaten the citizens’ loyalty towards the state, and reli-
gious organizations have faced tight restrictions, forcing them underground.28 Non-
official versions of Islam were referred to interchangeably as “extremism”, “Islamism”,
“Salafism”, “radicalism”, “Wahhabism”, and “Jihadism”, and such labelling even
extended to Protestant Christians.29
In the 1990s, a militant Islamist movement, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
(IMU), formed in opposition to Karimov’s rule. It joined the Taliban in Afghanistan
and was crushed after the 2001 war.30 Another Islamist group, Hizb ut-Tahrir, also
sought to build an Islamic society, albeit by peaceful means. Finally, the so-called Akro-
miya movement is devoted to spiritual salvation. Regime agents blamed all of these
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organizations for perpetrating lethal attacks in Tashkent in 1999 and 2004. However,
observers doubt the official narrative about Islamist terrorism, arguing that the bomb-
ings were part of a power struggle between different factions of the security apparatus.
Uzbekistan gained new international allies after 2001 by joining the global war on
terror, primarily against Afghanistan. The closure of the political sphere kept opposi-
tional activists in exile or imprisoned facing torture.
In May 2005, security forces perpetrated a massacre in Andijon in the Fergana
Valley. Local protests were first triggered by an unfair trial against 23 middle-class
entrepreneurs who were charged with being members of the Akromiya.31 The trial
was monitored by 1,000 to 4,000 people outside, an unusual gathering of citizens. On
the last day of the proceedings, the judges announced that the defendants would be
imprisoned indefinitely without a verdict. Enraged family members and friends
stormed the prison and freed them and others during the night. The group joined pro-
testers in occupying the regional administration building in Bobur Square on 13 May
and publicly denounced social and political injustice. Throughout the day, snipers
and security forces from all branches killed hundreds of protesters.32 Citizens from
Andijon who tried to flee to the nearby Kyrgyz border were met with gunfire by
Uzbek guards.33
According to some sources, the military and intelligence agencies assumed control of
the Ministry of Interior’s anti-terror units, indicating a power struggle from which the
former emerged victoriously.34 After the Uzbek government failed to conduct an inde-
pendent investigation as demanded by the United Nations (UN),35 the European Union
(EU) and US reacted by imposing sanctions that led to Uzbekistan’s swift realignment
with Russia through intensified collaboration in the Shanghai Cooperation Organiz-
ation (SCO) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization.36 Uzbekistan abolished
the death penalty in 2008, although severe and occasionally lethal torture continues
to this day. The number of political prisoners is estimated to be approximately 10,000.
3.2. Justification of repression
3.2.1. Justification of repression in Egypt
Egyptian officials have made extensive use of the frames “security”, “order”, and “ter-
rorism”. Their main narrative was that the Rabi’a Square protesters consisted only of
violent MB supporters, who were terrorists. In addition, the disruption of daily life
and public order were contrasted with the security of state and citizens. Then-Prime
Minister Beblawi “justified the use of force saying that Morsi loyalists had been inciting
chaos around the country, ‘terrorizing citizens, attacking public and private
property’.”37
One justification strategy was to depict the police forces as defending their own lives,
the state and its institutions. Therefore, officials highlighted and probably exaggerated
the number of wounded policemen, while downplaying the number of victims among
the protesters.38 Interior Minister Mohamed Ibrahim employed the argument of self-
defence, explaining that the police forces “were surprised by protesters who started
firing live ammunition” and added that “‘clear instructions’ were given to security
forces to limit use of weapons to teargas after protesters had been told to leave by
loudspeakers”.39
Framing protests as terrorism is a tried and tested narrative from the “war on terror”.
Even before the crackdown, on 24 July, al-Sisi had asked “all honest and trustworthy
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Egyptians” to “come out to give me the mandate and order that I confront violence and
potential terrorism”.40 Afterwards, during a news conference on 17 August, presidential
adviser Mostafa Hegazy said, “We are facing a war launched by extremist forces esca-
lating every day to a terrorist war”.41
Similar wording dominated government discourse and legislative amendments. In
the subsequent trials, the defendants – ranging from high-ranking MB members to
photojournalists – were accused of
forming an armed gathering of more than five people that endangers public safety and security
[…], premeditated murder of security personnel, vandalizing private and public property, for-
cibly occupying buildings, obstructing traffic, terrorizing the public, and restricting citizens’
right to freedom of movement and personal safety.42
The public prosecution ofﬁce held the MB liable for the violence that occurred during
the sit-in. When al-Sisi declared his candidacy for presidency in a televised March 2014
speech, he made terrorism the most prominent issue, stating,
My fellow citizens! We are threatened by the terrorists […]. It is true that this is my last day in
uniform but I will fight every day for Egypt free of fear and terror. […] we’d rather die before
Egyptians are terrorized.43
Besides the frame of terrorism, the reference to a legal basis for repression seemed to
be vital to Egyptian officials. While the crackdown was ongoing, government represen-
tatives declared that the crisis was being handled via “security measures within the fra-
mework of law”.44 Later, in an interview to Western audiences, al-Sisi referred to the
rule of law and non-interference with judicial processes when questioned on his coun-
try’s human rights record.45 Depicting repressive measures as being in accordance with
legislation has been a strategy of priority for judicializing repression since Mursi’s
ouster.46 Initiatives such as the 2013 protest law, the anti-terror legislation, and the
new constitution offer new regulations for judges to apply in unfair trials, and legalize
administrative sanctions by police and military forces.
3.2.2. Justification of repression in Uzbekistan
The Uzbek government justified the Andijon repression claiming that it was acting in
defence of the population against armed criminals. Karimov accused the protesters of
using women and children as human shields. The main narrative focused on Islamism,
which was becoming increasingly embedded in the global discourse on the war on
terror. In a press conference on 14 May, the president blamed the Akromiya for the
events and portrayed it as Hizb ut-Tahrir’s local branch, although the two movements
have no connection. Karimov drew a parallel to the unrest ensuing after the Tulip revo-
lution in Kyrgyzstan two months prior, insisting on foreign funding and the partici-
pation of foreigners seeking to establish a “Muslim Caliphate”.47 He cited intercepted
phone calls from protesters to Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan as proof of international
connections. The Foreign Ministry added the IMU to the list of suspects.48 Only a
year later, Karimov indirectly acknowledged socio-economic problems as a cause of
the protests and dismissed the province’s governor.49
During the first press conference after the Andijon events Karimov did not accuse
the protesters of being terrorists themselves, but over time the official rhetoric shifted
towards this terminology.50 In court, the charges filed against arrested activists included
“terrorism, attacking the constitutional order, murder, the organization of a criminal
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band, mass disturbances, the taking of hostages, and illegal possession of arms and
explosive materials”.51 Most of the defendants pleaded guilty, a testament to the horri-
ble torture in Uzbek prisons, which can also extend to family members.52 The forced
testimonies reflected the authorities’ confused approach that did not present a coherent
narrative, but a
vast conspiracy involving – in no particular order – the BBC, RFE/RL, Chechen military instruc-
tors, NGOs, training camps in Kyrgyzstan, the U.S. Embassy in Tashkent, and extremists linked
to Al-Qaeda [who] aimed to spark a Georgia/Ukraine/Kyrgyz-style revolution in Andijon in
order to transform Uzbekistan into an Islamic state that would serve as the launching pad for
a drive to establish a worldwide caliphate.53
The defendants were not able to obtain their verdicts, rendering them unable to
appeal.54
Journalists and human rights activists whose accounts of the Andijon events deviated
from the official story were defamed and persecuted as terrorism supporters. Indepen-
dent news websites were shut down in order to erase alternative narratives in a carefully
orchestrated “information black-out” intended to enforce the official version.55 In
addition to journalists, poets who wrote songs about the massacre were arrested for
insulting the president.56 Two citizens who possessed a cassette with the songs were
handed even harsher sentences.
Not all repression was justified. As in Egypt, the Uzbek government downplayed the
number of citizens killed to 187, well below the estimates from other sources of between
600 and 1,000 victims. Moreover, Karimov insisted that “not one peaceful citizen” had
been shot,57 especially not women and children. Witnesses reported that dead women
and children were hidden from the public and that only male victims were made avail-
able for identification in makeshift morgues.58 Justifications of repression reached their
limits when it came to obviously innocent victims.
4. Justification frames: contents and context
Table 3 summarizes which frames officials used to justify repression against opponents
in Egypt and Uzbekistan.
In both cases, the central claim was that the protesters were armed criminals who
had fired before the security forces opened fire. The danger to security also figured pro-
minently. Interestingly, in both countries the terrorism frame used against civilians who
were not only unarmed, but also not Islamists, gained importance over time and ren-
dered it the most popular ex-post legitimation of repression. Karimov only implicitly
mentioned terrorism in his press conference on Andijon, but amid international calls
for an independent investigation, instead of “criminal behaviour”, “terrorist aggression”
became the major accusation in the trials and the surrounding discourse.59 In Egypt, the
Table 3. Legitimation of repression in Egypt and Uzbekistan.
Frames: harmful behaviour Egypt 2013 Uzbekistan 2005
Terrorism ✓ ✓
Violence against state and citizens ✓ ✓
Disruption of everyday life (traffic, production) ✓ –
Extremism ✓ ✓
Foreign influence – ✓
Attacking the constitutional order – ✓
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terrorism frame was already introduced in preparation of the crackdown, and it loomed
large in state-controlled coverage of the events.
Whilst other frames, such as “disruption” or “foreign influence”, vanished shortly
after the repressive event, terrorism and extremism are the forms of harmful behaviour
both governments stressed in the months and years after the crackdowns. After some
months, frames about harmful behaviour subsided, while references to endangered
positive values from our conceptual framework of justifications, such as security,
unity, and so on, amplified in both cases. This could be interpreted as “normal” legit-
imation discourses setting in again after critical moments.
4.1. Domestic sources of learning
For tracing where the similar frames originate, the most obvious explanatory factor is
that both Egypt and Uzbekistan had a history of successfully utilizing terrorism dis-
courses. Officials thus resorted to established routines by labelling crackdowns as
“anti-terrorism”.
In Egypt, harsh repression accompanied by a security and terrorism discourse has
previously targeted the Islamist opposition, under the pretext of combating jihadist
militants. This happened after jihadists assassinated President Sadat in 1981, and in
the so-called civil war between jihadists and the state during the 1990s. The pattern
of first initiating a crackdown, then introducing certain narratives before altering legis-
lation to convict the defendants of terrorism in military courts already existed back
then.
During the repression against the MB in the 1990s, its members were frequently
accused of attacking buildings and people. Under Mubarak, the term terrorism
(irhāb) gained traction, and in 1992 the first Egyptian anti-terror law was passed.
Although until 2011 many political opponents and bloggers faced administrative
arrest for terrorism and/or drug charges, during the interim military rule of the
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) in 2011–2012 the typical accusation
against protesters became “thuggery”. During SCAF’s rule, the discourse shifted from
“revolution support” towards stability and safety as ends in themselves, as observable
in statements published on SCAF’s official Facebook site.60 Since the 2013 coup, the dis-
course centring on terrorism, security, and extremism has become a cover to justify not
only the repression of MB activists but also the entire crackdown targeting the liberal
opposition, the media, and NGOs.
The justification pattern used in Uzbekistan after the Andijon events also picked up
previous discourses. A long-standing narrative is to accuse opposition movements of
conspiring to destabilize the country and the region. Lumping different dissenting
groups together is a trademark of Karimov’s writings, where the words “opposition”
and “radical” are usually used together “as if to suggest that […] all opposition is by
definition radical”.61 Karimov’s strategy was to insist that “Uzbek Islamism is wholly
‘imported’ from outside the country”.62
In February 1999, first the Lebanese Hizbullah then Hizb ut-Tahrir were blamed for
car bombings in Tashkent, before the IMU and a secular politician in exile were indicted
in court, invoking the unlikely scenario of militant jihadism in Afghanistan taking on
Uzbekistan.63 Both in the 1999 and the 2004 bombings, rival clans dominating different
security services were suspected of being behind the violence.64 Given the positive inter-
national recognition of counterterrorism efforts, “a kind of controlled terrorism, when
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duly ascribed to its Islamist adversaries, might be acceptable and even desirable for the
regime”.65
Already in 2000, members of the political opposition were tried on charges of terror-
ism. The law defined terrorism as “socially dangerous wrong doing”.66 This definition
sees terrorism even in ideological goals, such as the future establishment of a caliphate,
without the exertion of violence.67 After the IMU had been crushed in the Afghanistan
war, Hizb ut-Tahrir was declared guilty of having organized the attacks of 2004. The
government pursued its “plan to tie all forms of protest to terrorism” also after May
2005 in Andijon.68
Some differences in the framings resulted from the domestic contexts, more specifi-
cally tried and tested discourses. The trials against protesters are a case in point. In
Uzbekistan, prosecutors emphasized radicalism and foreign conspiracies. According
to Horsman, this approach is rooted in Soviet legacy. He cites the “ideological and arbi-
trary definition of terrorism, the ‘criminalisation’ of the terrorist, the portrayal of exter-
nal conspiracies against the state and the call for popular mobilisation against the
threat”, as well as the court trials, as displaying similarities to the political climate of
the 1930s.69 This resemblance could be a result of political socialization, as Karimov
was the final Communist Party first secretary in Uzbekistan.
In Egypt, where the military depicts itself as the guarantor of national and state
security, threats to state property were stressed. Furthermore, as “the rule of law” has
been a widespread frame since President Sadat’s rule, the rhetorical reference to the leg-
ality of repressive means was common.
4.2. International sources of learning
The prominent role terrorism assumed in the discourses of both countries is also a
result of the diffusion of “war on terror” rhetoric and practices on the global level.
Together with previous collaboration with the US in “fighting terror”, international
learning processes may have encouraged both governments to use this frame.
While the Uzbek government has always employed a tough approach towards Isla-
mists, it enhanced its embryonic anti-terror discourse after 9/11 to receive financial
support. Western partners have taken the alleged presence of Islamists seriously and
supported Uzbekistan’s anti-terror fight for geostrategic reasons. The international
interest in a “stable” neighbour for Afghanistan diminished the danger of external criti-
cism of Uzbekistan’s policies and resulted in considerable Western assistance for police
and intelligence services.70 After the 2004 attacks, the government had referred to the
perpetrators as representing “jamoats”, which can be read as a reference to Egypt’s
al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya, the Egyptian state’s opponent in the 1990s civil war. This delib-
erate act of framing resulted from learning from Egypt and was directed at the inter-
national community “with US backing for Egypt’s ‘war on terrorism’ in mind”.71
One special counterterrorism unit that participated in the Andijon crackdown had
received training in the US.72 After the bombings in 1999 and 2004, the Uzbek govern-
ment had learned it could get away with blaming terrorists for creating unrest without
too many questions being asked, and it designed its rhetoric in 2005 accordingly.
However, this lesson did not hold in the extreme case of the regime violence in
Andijon, and both the EU and later the US imposed sanctions.
Egypt may have learned a lesson from events in Syria. There, by 2013, Assad partially
succeeded in convincing the international community of the opposition’s terrorist
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nature, not least by influencing circumstances to prompt a shift towards more extre-
mism.73 Given that even the fiercest repression can find some cover under a terrorism
discourse, combined with domestic experiences and the general impression of the
worldwide discursive success of the terrorism narrative, it is no wonder that the
interim military government took up this frame to justify the Rabi’a ‘Adawiya massacre.
When it comes to explaining differences in justifications, the divergent international
partners play an important role. China and Russia, as major authoritarian powers with a
communist past, are geographically proximate and have close linkages to Uzbekistan.
The SCO provides a regional platform for cooperation on the security level, which
was strengthened in the summer of 2005 after the West had called for an independent
investigation. It is also a site for promoting the so-called “Shanghai Spirit”,74 norms that
serve as an alternative to “Western” values. The fight against the “three evils” – extre-
mism, sectarianism, and terrorism – tops the SCO agenda.75 These issues also pervade
Uzbek justifications for repression.
A primary goal of Uzbekistan’s increased repression in 2005 was “diffusion-proof-
ing” to avoid a colour revolution. Neighbouring Kyrgyzstan had been the latest and
closest country where unrest had “resulted in the president’s decision to vacate
office”.76 Thus, in his above-mentioned press conference, Karimov refuted any simi-
larity with the colour revolution protests, to the point of denying that people had
assembled in a square. Here, the president tried to learn from others’ failures.
In Egypt, specific international sources of learning were comparatively less relevant:
the Arab League has been neither meaningful nor united enough to shape Egypt’s
framing. Quite to the contrary, some Arab monarchies followed Egypt’s example of
declaring the MB a terrorist organization.77 When it comes to learning from failure,
the Tahrir uprising was the most obvious, yet domestic source of learning.
4.3. Domestic addressees
Regarding similar frames, towards their own populations, officials rhetorically exploited
negative examples of violence in the respective regional neighbourhoods to validate the
need for repression. Instances of civil war and popular upheaval influenced the elite’s
threat perceptions, but they were primarily instrumentalized as justifications for
harsh measures to avoid the spillover of conflicts. Regarding civil war, Tajikistan
served as a cautionary tale for Uzbekistan, while Egypt could choose from a range of
violent conflicts in the region. Both governments were able to point to the challenge
of jihadism in their neighbourhood, most notably in Afghanistan and Syria.
A major concern to incumbents was to warn against the danger of protests, as
demonstrated by the colour revolutions and the Arab uprisings. For Uzbekistan, Kyr-
gyzstan represented the key negative example, while for Egypt, its own recent history
was a case in point. The latter is ironic, for even the military coined its 2013 coup
the completion of the Tahrir “revolution”. Demobilizing the domestic public was there-
fore a priority.
Diverging frames reflect the specific addressees in the respective contexts. In Egypt,
anarchy and the disruption of daily life through the week-long occupation of a public
square were prominent narratives. The highlighting of the right to “normal” life in
Egypt points to the context of the lasting political mobilization since the Arab Spring
and the profound changes that have imposed economic and emotional strain on
many citizens.
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In Uzbekistan, an important diversion strategy was the promotion of a nationalist
“Uzbek” Islam as opposed to transnational forms of Islam seen as dangerous. Thus,
the allegation of foreign influence in Andijon even amounted to the claim that
Taliban fighters were present. Outlandish conspiracy theories and allegations of radic-
alism were unique to Uzbekistan.
4.4. International addressees
As mentioned before, the global war on terror has become a convenient blueprint for
justifying state violence both in Uzbekistan and Egypt. The West has been an important
addressee of anti-terrorism discourse in both states for some time. When the concrete
crackdown incidents disappeared from public discourse, a more general narrative
spread holding extremists responsible for imminent domestic collapse and regional
instability. In an interview addressed to a US audience, al-Sisi offered his interpretation
of the MB as “the godfather of all terrorist organizations”.78 In addition, with his speech
before the UN General Assembly in October 2015, al-Sisi presented his window-dres-
sing programme against terrorism. This is part of Egypt’s discursive shift on the inter-
national stage: the topics extremism and terrorism now outweigh buzzwords of stability
and peace that were typical in the 1990s and 2000s in speeches to the UN General
Assembly.79
The Uzbek government also pursued a sophisticated approach to transmit its own
reading of events to an external audience. Its embassy in the US distributed a video
in support of the official narrative to think tank scholars in an effort to win over
Western academics. However, parts of this “documentary” were also used inside Uzbe-
kistan in a propaganda video that was frequently broadcast on television in the summer
of 2005.80
While Uzbekistan’s security cooperation involved diverse states, Egypt’s close
relations to the US were less balanced by other great powers. Thus, when both countries
experienced pressure and scepticism from the Western and international communities
after their crackdowns, reactions differed. Whilst the Uzbek president talked about
“true and false friends” of his country following the imposition of US and EU sanctions
in his speech at the SCO summit on 14 June 2006, his Egyptian counterpart lamented
about the US not supporting his country enough.81
The reactions by international addressees towards the crackdowns and the immedi-
ate justification efforts diverged. Russian officials and media took up the Uzbek govern-
ment’s framing, asserting that the dead of Andijon were “‘militants, comprising bandits,
Islamist radicals, and Taliban fighters’ [who had] infiltrated from Afghanistan”.82 The
fact that foreign influence was used to frame Uzbek protesters can be interpreted as a
strategy directed at other international actors who do not really know what is going
on inside the opaque politics of the country.83 In Egypt, while using the argument of
foreign influence is not alien to the al-Sisi government in other contexts, the frame
was not used to justify the Rabi’a crackdown.
Rather, the Interior Ministry stressed its adherence to law in an interview with
Western media, for example, when claiming “accordance with internationally accepted
crowd-control standards”.84 The fact that the government is aware of international
human rights observers was reflected in its rhetorical support for investigations of
the incidents. However, the lack of results even led to interim President Adly
Mansour calling for a renewed investigation, which the Justice Ministry denied.85
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5. Conclusion and outlook
This article has highlighted the links between legitimation and repression by analysing
the justifications of the crackdowns on mass protests in Egypt and Uzbekistan in 2013
and 2005, respectively. We have argued that examining the addressees of official dis-
courses and the sources of learning are central to understanding the governmental
framing of opponents and repressive events. We suggest that combining the current
research on authoritarianism with the framing approach provides scholars with concep-
tual and theoretical tools to investigate the discourses of autocratic rulers at such critical
points in time, while also taking international influences into account. Our explorative
analysis of two cases of brutal crackdown leads to innovative hypotheses that merit
more thorough investigation in other contexts of governmental justifications.
Regarding the general frames, the justifications offered for the crackdowns were very
similar. In both countries, the security and stability of the state and society were
invoked, whereas protesters and their allegedly affiliated groups were accused of crim-
inal behaviour, terrorism, extremism, violence, and disruption. The allegations brought
forward echo Dukalskis’ findings from other cases.86 With regard to the timing of
frames, we found that many frames referring to “harmful behaviour” were replaced
by more vague “values” rhetoric over time – with extremism and terrorism being the
crucial exception. We thus suggest to distinguish between temporally close and
distant frames in future studies.
Whilst the terrorism frame is not a universal tool – it was notably not used after the
Tiananmen Square massacre87 – it appears to be a popular justification in the current
century. We hypothesize that terrorism and stability discourses are likely to be used
under both extraordinary and “normal” conditions of contention, as the regime
phases in our cases had little impact on the discourses. One important cause of the
popularity of the terrorism frame is, in our reading, that it links concrete events and
abstract risks to which both domestic and international addressees can relate.
Effects of international influences seem to play a large role in the choice of the
general direction of frames besides their embeddedness in the respective regime’s legit-
imation strategies. Although the rulers in both countries feared large-scale political
protest, they claimed to face threats that tied in with the global diffusion of the war
on terror discourse. Looking at the more specific justification frames, the “fine-
tuning” of frames can be thought of as a second step in the elites’ discourse strategy
when they consider additional audiences and potential negative reactions from the
international sphere. For example, the strong Egyptian focus on legality was to some
extent directed towards a Western audience, whereas the foreign interference frame
that was prominent in Uzbekistan echoed narratives that prevailed in its regional
surroundings.
Our findings also support theoretical arguments on the international factors stabiliz-
ing authoritarian rule: Learning from abroad was triggered by geographical and system
proximity, as epitomized by the negative Kyrgyz example. Uzbekistan made use of lin-
kages to authoritarian great powers through regional organizations to underscore
regime discourses and resolve isolation on the international scene. The analysis
points to a case of learning a lesson that only partly held true for the extraordinary
scale of repression: Despite adapting their frames to international addressees, both
Uzbekistan and Egypt were subject to negative international reactions – sanctions
and freezing of military assistance.
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These repercussions highlight the fact that, besides studying the contents of frames,
another path worth pursuing would be to examine the effects of the legitimation of
repression. The impact could range from military support or, if resonance is low, sanc-
tions on the international level, to mobilizing and radicalizing effects in the domestic
sphere. Harsh repression has often led to radicalization, turning initially false accusa-
tions into self-fulfilling prophecies. While the effects of repression itself are being
increasingly studied, we argue that a government’s justification of repression should
receive more attention. The frames’ (non-)resonance with the audience and counter-
framing efforts would be crucial topics of study. The counter-framing by opposition
activists indicates that the question of where the “real” threat to security comes from
is highly contested even under harsh authoritarianism. In his song about the Andijon
massacre, Uzbek poet Dadaxon Hasanov sang: “We know who the terrorist is”.88
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